Curriculum vitae

De La Bruslerie Hubert

Professeur des universités
DRM

Hubert.DE-LA-BRUSLERIEping@dauphinepong.fr
Tel : 01 44 05 43 27
Bureau : P 606bis

Publications

Articles

de La Bruslerie H. (2015), Decreasing term structure of psychological discount rates: Experimental estimation and determinants, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 6, p. 13–26

Many empirical and behavioral studies identify a decreasing slope in the term structure of subjective discount rates. Using an experimental methodology based on "free-time" relative comparisons, this paper aims to identify in individual behaviors whether agents see their psychological value of time as decreasing or not. We elicit the negative shape of the subjective discount rates. They can be parameterized using two variables, one specifying the instantaneous time preference and the other characterizing the slope of the term structure. A trade-off law is identified between these two parameters. We show that the term structure of psychological rates depends strongly on gender, but appears not to be linked with life expectancy. We also question the cross-relationship between risk aversion and time preference. From a theoretical point of view, these two variables stand as two different and independent dimensions. However, empirically, the time preference attitude seems to be directly influenced by the risk attitude.

de La Bruslerie H., Fouilloux J. (2015), Interest Term Premiums and C-CAPM: A Test of a Parsimonious Model, Finance, 35, 3, p. 97-145

Cet article propose de modéliser les primes de terme de la structure par terme des taux d'intérêt nominaux au sein d'un modèle d'évaluation d'actifs basé sur la consommation. Le modèle utilise les primes de terme ex ante qui découlent de l'estimation des processus de volatilité de la consommation réelle et de l'inflation. La principale contribution de ce papier est de dériver et de tester un modèle qui met en évidence une relation linéaire entre les primes de terme, d'une part, et les volatilités conditionnelles de la consommation et de l'inflation ainsi que la covariance, d'autre part. L'estimation empirique sur des données américaines de taux d'intérêt, de consommation et d'inflation, valide le modèle. Celui-ci explique une partie du puzzle attaché aux modèles d'équilibre de consommation. Les coefficients d'aversion au risque implicitement obtenus se situent entre 2 et 7.

This paper proposes a consumption-based model that accounts for term premiums of the nominal term structure of interest rates. The model focuses on ex ante term premiums, which depend on the volatility processes of real consumption and inflation. The contribution of the paper is to derive and test a parsimonious model that highlights linear relationship between term premiums and next period conditional volatilities. When calibrated to US data on interest rates, consumption and inflation, the model accounts for the C-CAPM expectations puzzle. Risk aversion coefficients between 2 and 7 are elicited.

de La Bruslerie H., Gabteni H. (2014), Voluntary disclosure of financial information by French firms: Does the introduction of IFRS matter?, Advances in Accounting, 30, 2, p. 367–380

This paper addresses the relationship between mandatory and voluntary information. The introduction of IFRS in 2005 modified mandatory information requirements and influenced the content and level of the discretionary information disclosed by firms. This background allows us to test whether the complementary or substitution hypothesis dominates. A French firm data panel is used to empirically analyze the consequence of IFRS introduction. Referring to the 2003-2008 period gives a long-term perspective and allows us to identify discretionary communication policies by building a proprietary voluntary disclosure score. We find that voluntary disclosure policies experienced an upward swing with the introduction of IFRS, giving support to the complementary hypothesis. We also demonstrate a dynamic relationship between disclosure and the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts. The practical implication of the paper is to show that firms' discretionary communication policies follow both a long-term and a short-term component to meet analysts' demands for information. Our contribution is to refer to a long-term sample in one country where the environment and regulation context is homogenous. Our disclosure score index seems to be a good measure to outline that idiosyncratic communication policies are complex and strategic.

de La Bruslerie H. (2014), L'Assomption de risques économiques élargis : Une clé pour la refondation du capitalisme actionnarial, La Revue du Financier, 36, 208-209, p. 28-40

L'existence de groupes de contrôle actionnarial conduit à questionner la limitation de la responsabilité des actionnaires aux seuls apports. L'idée est ici de revenir sur cette caractéristique du droit des sociétés eu égard aux responsabilités nouvelles introduites par la RSE dans la gestion des entreprises. Le contrôlant remplit une fonction économique centrale de contrôle stratégique. Sa plus grande responsabilisation doit entrainer en contrepartie une rémunération spécifique quasi contractuelle qui devrait se substituer aux bénéfices privés. Nous étudions les caractéristiques de ce que seraient les dividendes du contrôle.

Concentrated ownership and corporate control are characteristics of many economies, particularly in Europe. This leads to questions about the shareholders' limited liability as the controlling group is protected from the negative consequences of his decisions. We propose to extend the scope of the controlling group's legal liability in order to make him responsible for the CSR consequences of the decisions made by the firm. The controller is associated with long-term and strategic choices of the firm which may have a strong SCR dimension. This regulation mechanism will help to enforce CSR within firms. As counterparty and to develop a contractual mechanism, the controlling shareholder must receive a specific remuneration above his standard return as investor. The paper describes what is called the dividend for control.

de La Bruslerie H. (2014), How to reorganize capitalism? The tracks of a specific compensation to the controlling shareholder and an enlarged corporate responsibility., Revue française de gestion, 242, p. 11-35

Cet article développe l'idée que le capitalisme actionnarial doit retrouver certaines de ses racines historiques. Ce sujet est abordé par le biais de l'analyse juridique de l'économie. La société de capitaux, instruments juridiques du capitalisme, introduit une responsabilité des actionnaires limitées aux apports. Cela a pour conséquence paradoxale de favoriser une certaine irresponsabilité. Le développement des groupes de contrôle actionnarial n'est pas un dévoiement mais une donnée du capitalisme moderne. Il faut en profiter pour réorganiser le système de la responsabilité en l'élargissant et en reconnaissant, par exemple, la responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise (RSE). Logiquement il est proposé qu'une rémunération spécifique accompagne les responsabilités nouvelles et les risques assumés par certains actionnaires mais pas par tous.

The role of shareholders in modern capitalism should remember its historical roots. Legal analysis of the economic system is privileged in the paper. Corporation is the legal tool of modern capitalism; it introduces a liability limited to the stock held by shareholders. Paradoxically it may have developed some form of irresponsibility at the firm level. The current situation shows that controlling shareholders or controlling blocks are frequent either in large or in family firms. This situation should not be regarded as a failure but as a characteristic of modern capitalism. It gives an opportunity to reorganize the system of corporate responsibility and to introduce the idea of Social Corporate Responsibility (SCR) in its scope. As a consequence, it is proposed that these new responsibilities and risks should be paid for and that a specific right to profit should be given to those shareholders who will assume them.

de La Bruslerie H. (2013), Equal opportunity rule vs. market rule in transfer of control: How can private benefits help to provide an answer?, Journal of corporate finance, 23, p. 88–107

Having been introduced in the European Union and in many other countries, the equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. This rule should be analyzed in a context of appropriation of private benefits between the new controlling shareholders and the outside investors. Both parties need to design a new implicit contract to share the firm's ownership. Using a signaling model, we show that the new controlling shareholder issues signals to outside shareholders to deliver private information on a firm's future economic return and her private rate of appropriation. The ownership stake of the controlling shareholder and the premium embedded in the acquisition price are key parameters. In a controlling ownership system, the equal opportunity rule modifies the relative behavior of controlling and outside shareholders. The quality of information deteriorates but the discipline on appropriation may become stronger.

de La Bruslerie H. (2013), Crossing takeover premiums and mix of payment : an empirical test of contractual setting in M&A transactions, Journal of Banking and Finance, 37, 6, p. 2106-2123

The analyses of the tender offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be performed separately. In the empirical literature, these two variables are often considered independently, although they may have an endogenous relationship in a contractual setting. Using a sample of European M&As over the 2000-2010 decade, we show that these two variables are jointly set in a contractual empirical approach. The relationship between the percentage of cash and the offer premium is positive: higher premiums yield payments with more cash. We highlight that the payment choice is not a continuum between full cash and full share payments. Two different regimes of payment in M&A transactions are empirically characterized. We analyze the major determinants of M&A terms when the offer premium and the means of payment are jointly set. The underlying rationale of an asymmetry of information and a risk-sharing calculus is found to be significant in the setting of the agreement.

de La Bruslerie H., Latrous I. (2012), Ownership structure and debt leverage: Empirical test of a trade-off hypothesis on French firms, Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 22, 4, p. 111–130

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an inverted U-shape relationship between shareholders' ownership and leverage. At low levels of ownership, controlling shareholders use more debt in order to inflate their stake in capital and to resist unfriendly takeovers attempts. When ownership reaches a certain point, controlling shareholders' objectives further converge with those of outside shareholders. Moreover, financial distress will prompt controlling shareholders to reduce the firm's leverage ratio. Empirically, it is shown that the inflection point where the sign of the relationship between ownership and debt changes is around 40%. Debts may help in curbing private appropriation and appears also as a governance variable.

Pratlong F., de La Bruslerie H. (2012), The pyschological value of time: a survey of the litterature, L'actualité économique, 88, 3, p. 361-400

Cet article procède à une synthèse de la littérature sur la question de la valeur psychologique du temps. Il discute des différents déterminants du taux d'actualisation et la possibilité d'avoir une fonction d'escompte de type hyperbolique. L'approche historique permet de retracer les origines du concept de valeur psychologique du temps. Ce concept est ensuite rediscuter dans le cadre de la théorie des perspectives, en considérant que l'utilité ressentie de l'agent vient modifier la structure de leur valeur psychologique du temps. L'analyse des résultats empiriques et des méthodologies d'identification permet de mettre en évidence que motifs individuels et psychologiques conditionnent le caractère intertemporel des choix.

This article provides an overview of the literature on the psychological value of time. It discusses various determinants of the discount rate and the possibility of hyperbolic discounting. The historical approach helps us to trace the origins of the concept of psychological value of time. This concept is then discussed again within the framework of the prospect theory, considering that perceived utility of the agent alters the structure of their psychological value of time. The analysis of empirical findings and methodologies of identification can demonstrate that individual and psychological motives condition the nature of intertemporal choice.

de La Bruslerie H. (2012), Corporate acquisition process: Is there an optimal cash-equity payment mix?, International Review of Law and Economics, 32, 1, p. 83-94

This paper examines the combination of cash and share payments made during corporate acquisitions. Particularly, it analyzes the conditions of an optimal mixed payment in a context of asymmetry of information. Using a model, we highlight that the setting of conditions of payment is an endogenous part of a takeover agreement between the acquirer and the target. Our contribution is to show how, in the acquisition process, the cash percentage setting is a key element for conveying private information on the gains of synergy and the gains resulting from the transaction. We internalize in our model asymmetries of information and possible exaggeration biases. Both will influence the joint setting of a mixed payment scheme.

de La Bruslerie H. (2011), The setting of a coalition contract between controlling shareholder, managers and executives: How to mix incentive and political logics?, International Journal of Corporate Governance, 2, 3-4, p. 237-267

The leveraging of control is the possibility for the controlling shareholder to lower his direct participation in capital through a convergence of financial and economic interest with other shareholders in the firm. In this paper, the setting of a coalition contract is done by awarding stocks to managers and executives. This paper analyses it jointly, on one side, in a rationale of economic incentive and, on the other side, in a rationale of political coalition of the initial dominant shareholder with managers and executives/employees. It is shown that the two logics are not opposite but complementary. The sharing of the private benefits within members of the new coalition is at the heart of a new implicit contract. The initial controlling shareholder "buys" efficient efforts by awarding a stake of capital to managers or executives, but also by allowing them to share a part of the private benefits and to join a new dominant group. Even if the effort function of the executives is weakly productive, a targeted broad diffusion of new stocks may still respect the coherence between an economic incentive rationale and a political substitution rationale.

de La Bruslerie H., Gillet R. (2010), The Consequences of Issuing Convertible Bonds: Dilution and/or Financial Restructuring?, European Financial Management, 16, 4, p. 552-584

Historically, most convertible bond (CB) issues have been converted to equity sooner or later. The announcement of a CB issue will bring about a future dilution of the firm's capital, and is often followed by a drop in share price. However, a CB issue by itself creates future value for the shareholders if it enables the firm to make profitable investments. It can also issue a positive signal regarding the restructuring of the firm's financial liabilities and its attempts to optimise its financial structure. These positive effects, if they occur, will develop gradually after the issue, and cannot be identified by a simple short-term event analysis of a CB issue announcement. In this paper, we test the significance of the dilution effect, coupled with a possible value creation effect, using data from the French stock market. We introduce a comparison between dilutive convertibles and nondilutive exchangeable bonds. By integrating different corrections and by selecting a window of analysis over a longer period after the announcement of the issue, we show that the negative cumulative average abnormal returns generally observed in previous studies become non-significant. This absence of global incidence is indicative of large differences in individual behaviour by issuers of CBs, and leads us to take into account the strategic choices linked to the issue of a CB. Two goals, often described as 'investment financing' or 'financial restructuring', may exist when issuing, and may appear to explain the size of the abnormal returns.

de La Bruslerie H. (2009), Time horizon, finance and firm's decision making, Revue française de gestion, 35, 198-199, p. 31-57

Le temps est à la fois une ressource économique et une dimension du choix. C'est parce qu'il existe une préférence temporelle que se pose, au moment d'un choix économique, la nécessité d'une évaluation psychologique du temps. L'objet de cet article est de rappeler que la temporalité dans l'action est un des aspects de la théorie économique des choix. En particulier l'idée d'une structure de préférence temporelle décroissante est une voie d'ouverture intéressante pour réintégrer le long terme. À l'inverse, le marché financier présente la caractéristique d'un possible biais court-termiste. d'entreprise. Enfin, on rappelle que le rythme de l'action impose son temps propre au niveau de l'organisation complexe qu'est l'entreprise.

Time is at the same time an economic resource and a valuable characteristic of choices. When taking an economic decision, time preference for immediacy questions how to give a psychological value to time. This article recalls that the value of time is a common dimension to finance and management theories. Economic choices refer to time when considering individual consumption or saving decisions or corporate organisational choices. We know that time horizons are not similar and time preferences complex. The concept of a decreasing subjective time value opens new perspectives to explain the influence of far long term in decision making. This possibility is counterbalanced by the traditional vision of short-termism attached to financial market valuation process. This bias does not imply a similar short term bias in corporate manager's decisions. At last, we will recall that the strategic pace of choice is genuine to each firm and introduces a new time dimension in the firm's decision process.

Deffains-Crapsky C., de La Bruslerie H. (2008), Information asymmetry, contract design and process of negotiation: The stock options awarding case, Journal of corporate finance, 14, 2, p. 73-91

Stock option plans are used to increase managerial incentives, and business practices usually set the exercise price equal to the stock market price. The purpose of this paper is to underline the importance of a process of negotiation leading to a possible equilibrium contract satisfying both managers and shareholders. The two key variables of the model are the percentage of equity capital offered by the shareholders to the managers and the exercise price of the options that may be at a discount. We explicitly introduce risk aversion and information asymmetries in the form of (i) an economic uncertainty in the gain of cash flow, (ii) possibly biased information between the two parties and (iii) a noise in the valuation price of the stock in the market. The existence of a process of negotiation between shareholders and managers leading to a possible disclosure of private information is highlighted. As a conclusion, we show that "efficient" stock option plans should be granted in a context of trade-off between the percentage of capital awarded to managers and the discount in stock price.

de La Bruslerie H., Deffains-Crapsky C. (2005), Takeover bids, unconditional offer price and investor protection, Review of Financial Economics, 14, 2, p. 103-126

In this paper, we develop a contingent claim analysis on shareholders' right to sell unconditionally their shares at the acquisition bid price during a takeover bid procedure. Compared with a situation without any guarantee, this regulation brings about wealth transfer towards outside shareholders. Why, in an apparently irrational way, do outside shareholders, who may benefit from a price guarantee, not systematically sell their shares? That question emphasizes the outside shareholders' behavior. Using a real option valuation model to evaluate the price guarantee opportunity, we show that an equal treatment rule between controlling and outside shareholders may lead outside shareholders to sell their shares.

de La Bruslerie H. (2004), Active bond strategies: What link between forecasting ability, excess return and performance?, Journal of Asset Management, 5, 2, p. 105-119

The active management of a portfolio should not be appreciated only in terms of excess profitability vis-à-vis a reference benchmark. It is part of a complete process where a manager's superior expertise is supposed to exist 'upstream'. This paper aims to analyse the tie between forecasting ability and excess performance in active management. It limits itself to bond portfolio management, but takes into account the international environment. A simulation of choices of maturity and choices of market in an environment with four currencies will show a link between forecasting ability and the expectation of excess return. The opening of the international environment shows a superior potential for gain in comparison with domestic active management, but introduces a strong complexity.

Ouvrages

de La Bruslerie H. (2014), Analyse financière : information financière, évaluation, diagnostic?, Paris?, Dunod, V-521 p. p.

L'analyse financière a pour objet central le capital et la création de richesse économique de l'entreprise. Ses objectifs diffèrent selon la nature des apporteurs de capitaux : les actionnaires privilégient la valeur du capital et les prêteurs, la capacité de remboursement actuelle et future. Cet ouvrage présente ces deux optiques, ainsi que la méthodologie, les concepts et les outils qui leur sont communs. Selon une démarche de diagnostic financier de l'entreprise, il traite : o de l'information comptable et financière ; o du bilan financier et du compte de résultat ; o du diagnostic de la performance et de la rentabilité ; o de la dynamique du cycle d'exploitation et du besoin en fonds de roulement ; o de l'autofinancement, de l'équilibre financier fonctionnel et de la trésorerie ; o des méthodes d'évaluation de l'entreprise ; o de la défaillance et de l'analyse du risque crédit par le prêteur. Cette 5e édition insiste sur les méthodes d'évaluation de l'entreprise. Elle intègre l'évolution des normes comptables IFRS (consolidation, traitement du goodwill, etc.) et un lexique anglais-français des termes comptables et financiers.

de La Bruslerie H. (2010), L'entreprise et le contrat : jeu et enjeux, Paris, Economica, 389 p.

Analyse de la logique de contrat entre les acteurs financiers de l'entreprise, prenant en compte les problèmes d'asymétrie d'information et d'incitation. Les relations entre groupes de contrôle et actionnaires minoritaires sont une caractéristique du fonctionnement des entreprises étudiée ici au-delà du cadre strictement juridique dans un contexte de contrat de répartition des tâches.

de La Bruslerie H. (2010), Analyse financière, Paris, Dunod, 517 p.

L'analyse financière a pour objet central le capital et la création de richesse économique de l'entreprise. Ses objectifs diffèrent selon la nature des apporteurs de capitaux : les actionnaires privilégiant la valeur du capital et les prêteurs, la capacité de remboursement actuelle et future. Cet ouvrage présente ces deux optiques, ainsi que la méthodologie, les concepts et les outils qui leur sont communs. Selon une démarche de diagnostic financier de l'entreprise, il traite : * de l'information comptable et financière ; * du bilan financier, du compte de résultat et de l'annexe ; * du diagnostic de la performance et de la rentabilité ; * de la dynamique des flux et de celle du cycle d'exploitation ; * de l'autofinancement, de l'équilibre financier fonctionnel, de la trésorerie et des tableaux de flux ; * des méthodes d'évaluation de l'entreprise ; * de la défaillance et de l'analyse du risque crédit par le prêteur

Direction d'ouvrages

Eliez C., de La Bruslerie H. (2012), Trésorerie d'entreprise, Paris, Dunod, 720 p.

Synthèse sur la gestion de trésorerie dans ses deux grands axes d'action : la gestion des liquidités et la gestion des risques financiers, en mettant l'accent sur le cash management et l'affacturage.

Chapitres d'ouvrage

de La Bruslerie H. (2014), Le contrôle dans les entreprises est-il compatible avec la responsabilité limitée des actionnaires contrôlants ?, in Dauphine Recherches en management . (dir.), L'état des entreprises 2014, Paris?, La Découverte, p. 56-68

de La Bruslerie H. (2010), Perspectives nouvelles en Théorie des organisations : Jacques Rojot vs. Hayek ?, in Chanut V., Bournois F. (dir.), Les organisations ont leurs raisons que la raison n'ignore pas : la rationalité managériale en recherches, mélanges en l'honneur de Jacques Rojot, Paris, ESKA, p. 111-123

Dans son ouvrage magistral Théorie des Organisations, J. Rojot avance deux noms d'auteurs qui ouvrent chacun une piste d'avancée vers ce qu'il appelle « l'individualisme méthodologique complexe » : J.P. Dupuy et I. Giddens . Est-ce à dire que l'individualisme méthodologique complexe est la voie privilégié d'interrogation pour le chercheur en organisations et au-delà en Sciences de Gestion ? Il ne s'agit pas ici de vouloir analyser les écrits ou les apports de Dupuy et de Giddens, ni de critiquer l'ouverture importante que constitue la voie de l'individualisme méthodologique complexe, mais plutôt de la poursuivre en la complétant par les apports d'un troisième auteur bien connu en économie et moins en sciences de gestion : Friedrich Von Hayek.

Communications

de La Bruslerie H. (2015), Analysts' forecast revisions and informativeness of the acquirer's stock after M&A transactions, 24th European Financial Management Association Annual Meeting - EFMA 2015, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Are mergers and acquisitions significant events that develop informativeness? Is the informativeness process the same in different countries? Looking only at cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) is insufficient and the results are sometimes contradictory. To answer to these questions we use the concept of informativeness to assess whether acquisitions improve the private information content of stock prices. We consider a sample of mergers and acquisitions in the US and Europe over the 2000-2013 period. We gauge informativeness by using different measures. First, we refer to the use of the synchronicity measure introduced by Roll (1988). We also refer to Amihud's (2002) illiquidity ratio and the Llorente et al.'s (2002) measure of informed trading to proxy informativeness. We relate these three measures to the analysts' activity to forecast EPS. We show that the disclosure process is partially linked to the sign and magnitude of the acquirer's abnormal return (CARs) at the announcement date. Informativeness of the stock price does not improve systematically between before and after the acquisition. It changes asymmetrically depending on the upward or downward forecast revisions after the acquisition.

de La Bruslerie H. (2014), Debt, Private Benefits, and Corporate Governance: An Analysis in an Option Valuation Framework, 31st International French Finance Association Conference, AFFI 2014, Aix-en-Provence, France

Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt helps to manage the type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A simple model is used to show that debt appears to be a key governance variable because it can moderate private benefits or, conversely, may aid diversion. It is argued in this paper that a self-regulation mechanism may develop even in the situation of control by a dominant shareholder. The joint questions of ownership, private benefits, and debt levels are linked. At low levels of debt, debt is relatively less disciplinary compared with a no private benefit case. When debt exceeds a certain threshold point, it becomes strongly disciplinary. Thus, a self-regulation mechanism develops where the controlling shareholder is incentivized to hold a larger equity stake when he/she wants to increase his/her private appropriation rate.

de La Bruslerie H. (2013), Share repurchase: Does it increase the informativeness of market prices?, 30th International French Finance Association Conference, Lyon, France

Share repurchases are transactions which are supposed to cause a market reaction through a signaling approach. However looking only at cumulated abnormal returns (CARs)is insufficient and the results are sometimes contradictory. We introduce the concept of informativeness to assess if repurchases improve the private information content of stock prices. Our empirical test comprises American and European buybacks in the period 1990 - 2011. We use the synchronicity measure introduced by Roll (1988) to follow the change in informativeness before and after the announcement of a transaction. The determinants of informativeness and CARs are also investigated. Our results are negative : Informativeness does not systematically improve, but may sometimes if a change of dividend policy jointly occurs.

de La Bruslerie H. (2012), Crossing takeover premiums and mix of payment: An empirical test of contractual setting in M&A transactions, Behavioural Finance Working Group/M&A Research Centre Conference : "Behavioural Finance and Cross Border Investments and Acquisitions", Londres, United Kingdom

The analyses of the tender offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be performed separately. In the empirical literature, these two variables are often considered independently, although they may have an endogenous relationship in a contractual setting. Using a sample of European M&As over the 2000-2010 decade, we show that these two variables are jointly set in a contractual empirical approach. The relationship between the percentage of cash and the offer premium is positive: higher premiums yield payments with more cash. We highlight that the payment choice is not a continuum between full cash and full share payments. Two different regimes of payment in M&A transactions are empirically characterized. We analyze the major determinants of M&A terms when the offer premium and the means of payment are jointly set. The underlying rationale of an asymmetry of information and a risk-sharing calculus is found to be significant in the setting of the agreement.

de La Bruslerie H., Latrous I. (2012), Ownership Structure and Debt Leverage: Empirical Test of a Trade-Off Hypothesis on French Firms, 29th International Conference of the French Finance Association, AFFI 2012, Strasbourg, France

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an inverted U-shape relationship between shareholders' ownership and leverage. At low levels of ownership, controlling shareholders use more debt in order to inflate their stake in capital and to resist unfriendly takeovers attempts. When ownership reaches a certain point, controlling shareholders' objectives further converge with those of outside shareholders. Moreover, financial distress will prompt controlling shareholders to reduce the firm's leverage ratio. Empirically, it is shown that the inflection point where the sign of the relationship between ownership and debt changes is around 40%. Debts may help in curbing private appropriation and appears also as a governance variable.

de La Bruslerie H. (2011), Crossing takeover premiums and mix of payment: Empirical test of contractual setting in M&A transactions, 10ème Conférence Internationale de Gouvernance, Montréal, Canada

Analysis of the tender offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be done separately. In the empirical literature these two variables are often considered independently although they may have endogenous relation in a contractual setting. Using a sample of European M&As over the 2000-2010 decade, we show that these two variables are jointly set in a contractual empirical approach. The relationship between the percentage of cash and the offer premium is positive: higher premiums will yield payments with more cash. We highlight that the payment choice is not a continuum between full cash and full share payment. Two different regimes of payment in M&A transactions are empirically characterized. We analyze the major determinants of M&A terms when the offer premium and the means of payment are jointly set. The underlying rationale of asymmetry of information and risk sharing calculus is found significant in the setting of the agreement.

de La Bruslerie H. (2011), Ownership structure, debt, and private benefits in controlled firms, 10ème Conférence Internationale de Gouvernance, Montréal, France

Controlled firms are in a framework where private benefits create a buffer between public earnings and economic profitability. We focus on debt leverage in the type II agency conflict between the controlling shareholder and outside investors. We use a simple discrete model comparing the capital ownership stake of the controlling shareholder with that of the outside investors in a framework without and with debt. The paper highlights that debt is a governance variable, as it can moderate private benefits or, conversely, help diversion. Debt appears in some situations as a disciplinary tool in the conflict between outside and controlling shareholders. It may self-regulate the two parties involved in a control contract. The setting of joint ownership between the controlling shareholder and outside investors depends on the perceived level of private benefits. It has a connection with future earning management. The key terms of agreement between the two parties are the stakes of equity capital as wished by each one and the leverage ratio.

de La Bruslerie H., Gabteni H. (2010), Voluntary Financial Disclosure, Introduction of IFRS and the Setting of a Communication Policy: an Empirical Test on SBF French Firms Using a Publication Score, 9ème Conférence Internationale de Gouvernance, Metz, France

A publication score of voluntary disclosed information disclosed by French firms was built on the 2003-2007 period. This original set of data is used to analyze the impact of the introduction of IFRS standards scheduled in 2005. It is also used to identify the determinants of communication policies set by listed firms. The publication score, for some firms and not all of them, outlines that useful qualitative information is brought to the market. Particularly, we show that highly communicant firms will reduce the information asymmetry as measured by the dispersion of analysts' forecasts of earning.

de La Bruslerie H. (2009), Term structure of psychological interest rates: A behavioural test, AFFI (Association Française de Finance), Paris, France

Many empirical and behavioral studies underline the idea of a non-flat term structure of subjective interest rates with a decreasing slope. Using an empirical test, this paper aims at identifying in individual behaviors whether agents see their psychological value of time decreasing or not. We show that the subjective interest rate follows a negatively sloped term structure. It can be parameterized using two variables, one specifying the instantaneous time preference, the other characterizing the slope of the term structure. A trade-off law called "balancing pressure law" is identified between these two parameters. We show that the term structure of psychological rates depends strongly on gender, but appears not to be linked with life expectancy. We also question the cross relationship between risk aversion and time preference. From a theoretical point of view, these two variables stand as two different and independent dimensions of choice. However, empirically, both time preference attitude and slope seem directly influenced by risk attitude.

Documents de travail

de La Bruslerie H. (2014), Do mergers and acquisitions improve informativeness about the acquirer's stock?,, 50

Are mergers and acquisitions significant events which develop informativeness seen as the disclosure of private and specific information after a transaction? Is the informativeness process the same between countries? To answer to these questions we use the concept of informativeness, as first developed by Roll (1988). We consider a sample of mergers and acquisitions in the US and in Europe over the 2000-2011 period. We show that the disclosure process is not linked with acquirer's abnormal returns at the announcement date. Informativeness improves over time. We show that the acquisition premium and the means of payment are particularly important in the disclosure process.

de La Bruslerie H., Gabteni H. (2012), Voluntary Disclosure vs. Mandatory Disclosure: The Case of IFRS Introduction on European Firms,, 48

The purpose of this study is to determine if the process of filtering out the financial information voluntary disclosed by firms is modified by the introduction of new mandatory information requirement. Voluntary information disclosed by French firms during the 2003-2008 period is compiled. This original dataset includes several years both before and after the introduction of the IFRS in the European Union in 2005. We use regression analysis to identify the determinants and consequences of the communications policies of listed firms. Particularly, we show that highly communicative firms may reduce the information asymmetry as measured by the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts when they voluntarily disclose information. The level of voluntary disclosure and earnings forecasts by analysts are endogenous and exhibit a complex two-way relationship. Voluntary communication policies did not change with the introduction of the IFRS.

de La Bruslerie H., Fouilloux J. (2010), Interest Term Premiums and C-CAPM: A Test of a Parsimonious Model,, Paris, Université Paris-Dauphine, 37

This paper proposes a consumption-based model that accounts for term premiums of the nominal term structure of interest rates. The driving force behind the model is the looking at the ex ante term premium. Nominal term premiums depend on the volatility processes of real consumption and inflation. When calibrated to US data on interest rates, consumption and inflation, the model accounts for the C-CAPM expectations puzzle. Risk aversion coefficients around 6 are evidenced. The hypothesis of non-constant subjective discount rates is envisaged but successfully validated.

de La Bruslerie H. (2009), The equal opportunity rule in transfer of control : a signaling model, Working Papers Chaire Finance d'entreprise Dauphine - FBF, Paris, Université Paris-Dauphine, 44

The equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. In order to better analyze the consequence of such a rule, we need to account for the information asymmetry that exists between new controlling shareholders and outside investors with private benefits. Both parties need to design a new implicit contract to share the firm's ownership, the first one controlling the firm, the other agreeing to stand as minor investors. Using a signaling model, we show that the new controlling shareholder issues signals to outside shareholders to deliver private information on the firm's future economic return and his private rate of appropriation. We highlight the fact that ownership is a good signal : the higher the share of capital of the controlling shareholder, the better the prospects for future economic return, as perceived by outsiders. Another signaling effect results from the premium embedded in the acquisition price, which also gives information on the future economic prospects of the firm. In a controlling ownership system, the equal opportunity rule modifies the relative behaviors of controlling and outside shareholders. The quality of information deteriorates despite the fact that the discipline may be stronger.

Autres publications

de la Bruslerie, H., (2015), Decreasing term structure of psychological discount rates: Experimental estimation and determinants , Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, vol.6, pp. 13-26

De La Bruslerie H., Martin A., (2013), Pour une évaluation fiscale des entreprises enfin pacifiée , Option Finance, n° 1214, 26 avril

de La Bruslerie H., (2012), Crise financière : Quelles conséquences pour l'avenir du financement de l'économie ?, Option Finance, 9 janvier 2012

de La Bruslerie H., Pratlong F.,(2012),La valeur psychologique du temps : Une synthèse de la littérature, Revue L'’Actualité Economique - Revue d'’analyse financière, Canada, septembre, volume 88, n° 3, pp.361-400

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