Curriculum vitae

Brousseau Éric

Professeur des universités
DRM

eric.brousseauping@dauphinepong.fr
Tel : + 33 1 44 05 46 97
Bureau : A 422

Biographie

Éric BROUSSEAU, est professeur à l’Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University et membre de l’UMR CNRS Dauphine Recherche en Management. Il dirige la Chaire Gouvernance et Régulation de la Fondation Paris-Dauphine et anime le Club des Régulateurs qui y est associé. Il collabore aussi avec l’Institut Universitaire Européen de Florence.

Ses recherches portent sur la gouvernance économique et la régulation des marchés. Il s’intéresse à la manière dont les stratégies des acteurs influencent l’organisation et l’évolution des institutions encadrant les activités économiques; d’où des travaux approfondis sur la régulation dans divers contextes contemporains ou historiques, national ou transnational ainsi que sur les interactions entre autorégulations et régulations publiques.

Il a publié près d’une centaine d’articles scientifiques et a dirigé la publication d’une quinzaine d’ouvrages dont, récemment, The Manufacturing of Markets ; legal, political and economic dynamics (Cambridge University Press, 2014). Il a également a mené des recherches pour les pouvoirs publics français, la Commission européenne, la NSF américaine, les Nations Unies, et l’OCDE.

Il est le directeur de l’Ecole Doctorale de Dauphine. Il est l’un des créateurs du Master Industries de Réseaux et Economie Numérique (IREN), co-habilité entre Dauphine, Polytechnique, Supélec, TélécomParisTech et l’Université Paris-Sud. Il dirige également le Master Management des Télécom et des Médias (226). Il a fondé en 2002 l’Institutional and Organizational Economics Academy (IOEA), et a présidé la Society for Institutional and Organizationa Economics (2013-2014). Il est également membre honoraire de l’Institut Universitaire de France.

Publications

Articles

Beuve J., Brousseau É., Sgard J. (2017), Mercantilism and Bureaucratic Modernization in Early Eighteenth-Century France, Economic History Review, 70, 2, p. 529-558

French mercantilism is generally associated with absolutist policymaking subject to capture by rent-seeking interests. This paper investigates how the Bureau du Commerce, a small agency in charge of commerce and the supply side, handed out rents and privileges to private entrepreneurs. We thus coded how it investigated and decided all 267 voluntary submissions received between 1724 and 1744. We show (i) that the Bureau's formal, rule-based decision-making process could actually differentiate between alternate policy aims and target them consistently over time, with more or less powerful sets of rents. From this (ii) we derive a hierarchy of revealed policy preferences. First comes technical innovation and diffusion, then local economic development; import substitution is only in the third position, followed by consumers' welfare. Lastly, and against a long line of authors, we show that the production of luxury-goods was not a significant or valued objective.

Brousseau E., Sgard J. (2015), A symposium on state and market regulation, International Review of Law and Economics, 42, p. 157

In September of 2011, a conference was held in Florence under the auspices of the European University Institute (Global Governance Program) and the University Paris-Dauphine (European School for New-Institutional Economics) on the relationships between legal orders, the organization of states, and economic development. The three following papers draw from this meeting, and though their respective empirical subjects present few obvious links, they indeed explore the interaction between state policies and capabilities, and the legal infrastructures of markets from different perspectives.

Brousseau E., Sgard J., Schemeil Y. (2012), Delegation without borders: On individual rights, constitutions and the global order, Global Constitutionalism, 1, 3, p. 455-484

Political and economic rights are envisaged as the outcome of an ongoing bargain between citizens and their rulers. Over the long run, this constitutive process shapes the development of both the economy and the state. Globalization, however, corresponds to a period where both the market and civil society extend far beyond the borders of the initial political compact. Hence, citizens may not only ask that cross-border transactions be made easier; they may also challenge the institutional cohesion and integrity of the classical, Westphalian state, i.e., its legal and judicial order, and its bureaucratic capabilities. We are proposing a schematic description of how this political process may gradually exit the national perimeter and deliver four possible models of international or global governance, depending upon the potential structuring of coalitions between the potential winners of the globalization both in the elite and in society, and the losers; national games being ultimately arbitrated by the international competition among elites, but also by the possible formation of global coalitions of citizens and merchants.

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2011), Regulators as Reflexive Governance Platforms, Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, 12, 3, p. 194-209

Network industries are now characterized by a regime of permanent innovation, while they continue to be fixed and sunk cost industries, due to the high level of investments in R&D and infrastructures. Players in these industries need to coordinate their investments; hence a threat of collusion. In the same time competition is fierce due to the opportunities brought by innovations; hence the permanent risk of catastrophic evolutions due to systemic interdependencies. To balance this dilemma between coordination and competition, independent third parties granted with capabilities to influence the "rules of the game" are needed. They need however to access critical information and knowledge. Coordination of investments requires figuring out the possible futures of the technology and of the industry. Avoiding oligopoly capture relies on an understanding of costs and business models. Since the relevant information and knowledge are dispersed and permanently evolving, regulators have to organize fora in which the stakeholders have incentives to reveal information, both because they need to learn from others, and because they seek to influence the industry regulation. Properly organized fora establish an open information competition among stakeholders, which can be penalized if they hide or distort information too much.

Brousseau E., Garrouste P., Raynaud E. (2011), Introduction to the symposium on "The Dynamics of Institutions in Perspectives: Alternative Conceptions and Future Challenges", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 79, 1-2, p. 1-2

? Understanding emergence and evolution is key to analyze the nature of institutions. ? Conceiving institutions as equilibria of beliefs allows exploring the role of rationality. ? Institutions might also be seen as the result of strategies by agents or coalitions. ? The dynamic of law result from the necessity to adapt to evolving issueq. ? @s{essing institutional performance raise the issue of transmission mechanisms

Andonova V., Ladrón de Guevara A., Brousseau E. (2011), Internet interacted: 1991-2003, Management Research, 9, 3, p. 192-206

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine how the market potential for internet services interacted historically with the diffusion process of fixed line and mobile telephony. Design/methodology/approach - The authors evaluate the historical interactions between internet, fixed line and mobile telephony using the International Telecommunications Union data set from 1991 until 2003 for 214 countries. Findings - It was found that between 1991 and 2003 mobile and internet services were fully complementary; fixed line facilitated the diffusion of internet service, but internet diffusion did not affect fixed line telephony. The authors discuss the implications of these results in the light of current developments of the telecommunications industry. Research limitations/implications - Internet adoption should be analysed in close relation to the adoption of other telecommunication services, such as fixed line and mobile telephony. Originality/value - The paper shows the interconnectivity of the internet with other telecommunication services and emphasizes the asymmetric nature of these interactions. Telecommunication services interactions are discussed in the light of recent industry developments.

Brousseau E., Garrouste P., Raynaud E. (2011), Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 79, 1-2, p. 3-19

This paper surveys alternative approaches to the emergence and evolution of institutions. The challenge is to develop frameworks capable of capturing both stability and change. We follow a "descaling" approach to show how founding assumptions about economics--namely, alternative assumptions about individual rationality and the role of social efficiency--influence our understanding of the drivers of institutional evolution. We then contrast two families of institutional theory. In the first, institutions are viewed as rules imposed on individuals and the focus is on the strategic games among coalitions that aim to promote or block new rules. In the second, institutions are viewed as shared beliefs; here the idea is to analyze how equilibria that are self-enforcing (in terms of mutual expectations about others' behaviors) can collapse and so induce switching to another equilibrium. Finally, we discuss the political economy literature that examines institutional transitions to a market economy, and we identify long-term drivers as well as short-term political barriers to institutional reforms.

Raynaud E., Brousseau E. (2011), "Climbing the hierarchical ladders of rules": A life-cycle theory of institutional evolution, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 79, 1-2, p. 65-79

This paper proposes an analysis of the emergence and evolution of institutional frameworks. It explains the causes, process, and outcome of institutional evolution. We first describe the institutional framework as a multilevel system at the bottom of which several "local and flexible" institutions apply to subsets of the society while, at the top, a single "generic and rigid" institution applies to all. Dissatisfied with generic order, promoters of local orders try to design collective governance solutions that are better suited to their needs. If agents are heterogeneous (as we assume), then coordination needs differ and a competitive process begins among sponsors of alternative orders. To benefit from efficiency gains, promoters of local orders encourage adherence to their preferred system of rules. The resulting competition for adherents explains why "local and voluntary" institutions might progressively turn into "generic and mandatory" ones. We thus establish a logical continuum between contractual governance mechanisms and institutions. We then analyze the strategic interplay among sponsors of alternative institutional orders by considering not only the "horizontal" competition among institutions emerging in the same time but also the "vertical" competition between promoters of new rules and sponsors of the established, more generic rules.

Brousseau E., Greif A. (2010), Introduction to the JCE Symposium on "The Dynamics of Institutions", Journal of comparative economics, 38, 3, p. 227-228

Brousseau E., Nicita A. (2010), How to design institutional frameworks for markets: New institutional economics meet the needs of industrial organization, Revue d'Economie Industrielle, 129-130, p. 87-118

L'influence des institutions sur les performances économiques est désormais largement reconnue en économie. Cet article cherche à mettre en évidence les principales leçons de politique économique que l'on peut tirer de la Nouvelle Economie Institutionnelle (NEI) quand il s'agit d'organiser des marchés. Nous examinons tout d'abord les domaines dans lesquels la NEI identifie des effets des outils institutionnels sur les performances économiques; à savoir l'établissement des droits de propriété, la gestion des externalités et la maintenance du processus concurrentiel. En second lieu, nous mettons en lumière les principaux arbitrages analysés. Cela nous amène à considérer les avantages et inconvénients de la coordination hiérarchique par opposition aux transactions marchandes, de la gouvernance publique comparée à la privée, de la centralisation par rapport à la décentralisation, des ordres formels ou informels. Nous concluons en évoquant les difficultés auxquelles les décideurs politiques doivent faire face lorsqu'il s'agit de gérer des réformes institutionnelles.

The key role of institutions for economic performance has recently been acknowledged in the economic policy debate. This paper aims at pointing out the main policy lessons and the recommendations to be drawn from New Institutional Economics (NIE), when considering the organization of markets. We examine, first, the domains - namely the establishment of property rights, the management of externalities and the maintenance of the competitive process - on which NIE identifies the potential impact of institutional tools on market performance. Second, we highlight the tradeoffs identified in the literature regarding the organization of an institutional system. This leads us to consider the respective virtues and drawbacks of hierarchical vs. transactional, public vs. private, centralized vs. decentralized and formal vs. informal ordering. Finally, we conclude by showing how NIE draws attention to the difficulties faced by political or economic decision-makers when they attempt to enhance market efficiency by reforming institutional frameworks.

Sgard J., Schemeil Y., Brousseau E. (2010), Bargaining on law and bureaucracies: A constitutional theory of development, Journal of comparative economics, 38, 3, p. 253-266

The process of development is linked to the rise of an integrated and competitive economy and polity that allow a maximal division of labor and innovation. This process relies on two intertwined dynamics. First, in the establishment of the rule of law, legal instruments are appropriated by those who call for more autonomy, resulting in a progressive equalization of rights. Second, development of a capable and impartial state is a prerequisite to implementation of rights, including their translation into services delivered to citizens. The mutual expansion of these dynamics relies on a vertical negotiation between the elite and the governed. The governed call for rights that are more firmly established and more extended. The ruling elite can grant these rights to maintain its legitimacy and hence its recognized authority. This model allows discussing the sustainability of various paths of institutional change in processes of development by identifying the potential virtuous dynamics and hindering factors.

Brousseau E. (2008), The Economics of Music Production: The Narrow Paths for Record Companies to Enter the Digital Era, Communications & Stratégies, 72, p. 131-153

On the basis of an in depth analysis of the flow of revenues within the music industry and of the emerging practices, we attempt to understand the logic at play in the current evolution of the structure of the industry. We claim that the record companies used to play a role that was useful for the dynamic and for the quality of music production, and analyze whether it can be maintained despite the impossibility for them to further control the formation and distribution of revenues generated by recorded music. Two antagonistic strategies, corresponding to different segments of the market, are highlighted in this paper. One targets the mass market and relies on the recognition by the on-line distributors of the mutual dependency between them and the record companies. It also admits that this music is characterized by short commercial life cycles and that it should be marketed as a consumer product. Moreover revenues are not necessarily generated by sales, but by the value of temporally exclusive release in some channels. The second model targets the wide number of niches at the fringe of this mass market and relies on the building of communities of customers sharing common tastes and values and on the development of their loyalty. The model is commercial, but relies clearly on the cooperation among the various stakeholders that build a common safe harbor enabling specific types of music to sustainably develop. Value added services funded by subscription have to be developed.

Brousseau E., Sattin J-F. (2007), Contracts to Assess the Law: Some Methodological Propositions Based on an Analysis of Technology Licensing Agreements to Assess the Patent Law, Revue économique, 58, 6, p. 1363-1386

Cet article présente une nouvelle méthode de construction des indicateurs institutionnels. Les indices existants à ce jour reposent presque exclusivement sur une analyse de l'offre de protection légale par les différents pays. A contrario, nous mobilisons ici la théorie des coûts de transaction pour développer des indicateurs institutionnels appréhendant la demande de protection légale telle qu'elle se trouve révélée par les arbitrages des agents économiques au niveau du choix des clauses contractuelles. Cette méthode est ensuite appliquée sur une base de contrats internationaux de licence de technologie disponible au service des Transferts techniques internationaux de l'Institut national de la propriété industrielle (INPI) afin de comparer les cadres institutionnels allemand, nippon et américain en matière de protection des innovations. Nos principaux résultats mettent en avant la forte protection apportée par les institutions allemandes ainsi que la faiblesse relative du cadre institutionnel japonais.

This paper presents a new methodology aimed at building institutional indicators. Up to now, all the available indicators have relied on an analysis of the supply of legal protection. Conversely we propose here a methodology based on the analysis of the demand for legal protection, as it is revealed by the choices of economic agents when designing contractual agreements, and which is inspired by Oaxaca's approach of discrimination on labor market [1973]. We rely on Transaction Cost Economics to analyze how agents design specific contractual clauses given the institutional environment. Observed differences between contracts established in contrasted institutional environments can then be interpreted as differences resulting from the later, if appropriate control variables are taken into account. We provide also an illustration based on a database of international licensing agreements developed with the French Patent office (INPI). As a main result, we highlight a stronger protection of intellectual property in Germany than in the us, as well as the weaknesses of the Japanese institutional framework on this ground.

Pénard T., Brousseau E. (2007), The Economics of Digital Business Models: A Framework for Analyzing the Economics of Platforms, Review of network economics, 6, 2, p. 81-114

The paper proposes an analytical framework for comparing different business models for producing information goods and digital services. It is based on three dimensions that also refer to contrasted literature: the economics of matching, the economics of assembling and the economics of knowledge management. Our framework attempts to identify the principal trade-offs at the core of choices among alternative digital business models, and to compare them in terms of competitiveness and efficiency. It also highlights the role played by users in the production of information goods and competition with pure suppliers.

Chaserant C., Coeurderoy R., Brousseau E. (2007), The Governance of Contracts: Empirical Evidence on Technology Licensing Agreements, JITE : journal of institutional and theoretical economics, 163, 2, p. 205-235

This paper provides new evidence on the contractual governance of technology licensing agreements. Using an international sample of licensing contracts, we explore how contracts are designed to deal with specific contractual risks. In particular, we comparatively assess the influences of transaction attributes, institutional frameworks, and strategic considerations on the creation of licenses. Empirical results reveal that contractual clauses for governance are crafted independently. This leads to a discussion of complementarities between contractual components, which are frequently assumed in theory. Furthermore, our results are certainly amongst the first to provide econometric evidence on the pervasive influence of private institutions on the trading of technology.

Brousseau E., Chaves B. (2005), Contrasted Paths of Adoption: Is E-business Really Converging Toward a Common Organizational Model?, Electronic Markets, 15, 3, p. 181-198

This paper seeks to provide a clearer understanding of discrepancies observed in the level, pace and style of e-business development across countries and industries. It is based on an original survey performed on 1,100 firms in five developed countries. Through in-depth analyses of the adoption, use and impact of e-business technologies and methods we highlight contrasted paths of adoption across countries and industries that cannot be explained by institutional and business factors alone. The dynamic of adoption or various types of technologies engages business networks on contrasted self-reinforcing paths that do not necessarily converge toward a common way of using ICTs to buy and sell or coordinate online. There are clearly two contrasted strategies. The first is to adopt e-business technologies and methods to enhance coordination with business partners. Such a strategy is aimed at saving costs. The second consists in adopting e-commerce technologies to buy and sell online. The latter strategy aims at increasing sales, but does not systematically do so. Success is linked to re-engineering and to the adoption of automated methods of coordination. Contrasted initial conditions result in businesses taking one of these two paths or blocking adoption at some point.

Siebenhüner B., Dedeurwaerdere T., Brousseau E. (2005), Introduction and overview to the special issue on biodiversity conservation, access and benefit-sharing and traditional knowledge, Ecological Economics, 53, 4, p. 439-444

The concept of access and benefit-sharing (ABS) in genetic resources as maintained by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) aims at promoting the conservation of biodiversity and equity between the North and the South at the same time. Its implementation challenges various disciplines. First, from an economic point of view, designing efficient ABS provisions turns to be highly complex given its multi-task and multi-agent problem structure, and given the lack of evidence that the economic benefits drawn from the exploitation of genetic resources will suffice to fund the preservation of biodiversity. Second, from a legal point of view, the principles of the CBD are very general. Their proper implementation requires the design of new intellectual property rights and new liability regimes, which challenge the current legal doctrines and have complex interactions with pre-existing legal regimes. Third, from the perspective of political and management sciences, the implementation of the CBD raises the question of how to design institutional frameworks that enable both democratic decision making taking into account the interests of the diverse stakeholders at the global level and collective learning considering the fact that humanity is dealing with complex problems characterized by numerous dimensions and high uncertainties. This special issue assembles a set of papers dealing with these issues and questions.

Brousseau E., Coeurderoy R. (2005), The Governance of Intellectual Property Rights in Knowledge Transfers: An Empirical Analysis of Supervision Provisions in Technology Licensing Agreements, International Journal of the Economics of Business, 12, 3, p. 403-424

Technology licensing provides innovators with the opportunity to substantially leverage their market expansion. But licensing also exposes valuable knowledge at appropriation and more generally to opportunism since it generates ex-post mutual interdependence. The long-term performance of the transfer for the licensor thus strongly depends upon its capability to govern the relationship successfully. Designing an efficient supervision mechanism is then key to good governance of licensing contracts. In this paper we analyse in detail the scope of supervision through three dimensions: supervision on sales; supervision on product quality; and supervision on industrial and R&D facilities. We show that licensors are likely to adjust the scope of supervision in line with contractual hazards, which depend upon the scope of the transfer, the competitive stakes, and the institutional and relational environment of the transfer. Evidence is provided by a cross-section sample of 207 licensing contracts by American, Japanese and European firms.

Brousseau E. (2004), Property rights on the internet: is a specific institutional framework needed?, Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 13, 5, p. 489-507

Digital technologies allow the implementation of more decentralized Property Rights (PR) systems as compared to those traditionally set-up by public authorities at the national level. The self-implementation of exclusive rights of use over information and the design of self-regulation by virtual communities enable agents to set-up and manage PR according to their local constraints and individual preferences. However, a decentralized system has weaknesses. It can result in conflicts and defaults of enforcement that might discourage investments. It can also induce inefficient capture of public goods and favor the development of monopolies. Implementing a last resort authority in charge of limiting and preventing these inefficiencies might result in a more efficient use of resources. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, it should supervise the behaviors of individuals and communities to prevent boundless capture of public wealh by`infividual interests, to solve conflicts among claims for exclusive rights of use and among local regulations, and to guarantee enforcement when exclusive rights of use are legitimate.

Brousseau E. (2003), E-Commerce in France: Did Early Adoption Prevent Its Development?, The Information Society, 19, 1, p. 45-57

France's early adoption of Minitel and EDI in the 1980s was both a stimulus and an inhibitor to Internet-based e-commerce. It hindered the adoption of the Internet, but it also created the conditions for a rapid catch up when France switched to the Internet in 1997. The French were already open to the use of IT, a dense network of online specialists and information service providers already existed, and many investments required to go digital were already made. On the other hand, by mid-2001 France was still far behind the early adopters of e-commerce over the Internet. This is because the French catch-up was checked by the implosion of the Internet financial bubble in 2000. Second, many Internet-based business models did not fit the French distribution channels. These differences suggest that e-commerce paths of development can be differentiated among nations, because both needs and solutions differ. This conclusion goes against the conventional wisdom that e-commerce will lead to the emergence of an integrated global marketplace in which common commercial practices will be implemented.

Brousseau E. (2002), The Governance of Transactions by Commercial Intermediaries: An Analysis of the Re-engineering of Intermediation by Electronic Commerce, International Journal of the Economics of Business, 9, 3, p. 353-374

Efficiency arguments explain why commercial intermediaries exist and will continue to be involved in the exchanges despite the spread of digital networks. Commercial intermediaries provide producers and consumers with a set of information, logistic, securization and insurance (and liquidity) services. By bundling these services and by dedicating assets and learning capabilities to their production, commercial intermediaries allow transaction costs to be reduced. Digital networks per se cannot allow transacting parties to benefit from such efficient providers of intermediation services. Rather than establishing direct relationships among producers and consumers, the Internet will support a re-organization of existing intermediation chains, because traditional intermediaries will reinforce their ability to provide these service by using ITs. The analysis of the role of commercial intermediaries thus leads to a better understanding of the future of e-commerce. In turn, e-commerce provides New-Institutional Economics with a stimulating case study.

Ouvrages

Brousseau E., Curien N. (2007), Internet and digital economics: principles, methods and applications, Cambridge? ; New York, Cambridge University Press, XXVI-796 p. p.

How are our societies being transformed by Internet and digital economics? This book provides an accessible introduction to the economics of the Internet and a comprehensive account of the mechanisms of the digital economy. Leading scholars examine the original economic and business models being developed as a result of the Internet system, and explore their impact on our economies and societies. Key issues are analyzed, including the development of open source software and online communities, peer-to-peer and online sharing of cultural goods, electronic markets and the rise of new information intermediaries, e-retailing and e-banking. The volume examines how Internet and digital economics have transformed the organization of firms, industries, markets, commerce, modes of distribution, money, finance, and innovation processes, and provides the analytical tools to understand both these recent transformations and the likely future directions of the "New Economy".

Brousseau E. (1993), L'économie des contrats : technologies de l'information et coordination interentreprises, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 368 p. p.

Direction d'ouvrages

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2014), The manufacturing of markets: legal, political and economic dynamics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 548 p.

Different types of markets exist throughout the world but how are they created? In this book, an interdisciplinary team of authors provide an evolutionary vision of how markets are designed and shaped. Drawing on a series of case studies, they show that markets are far from perfect and natural mechanisms, and propose a new view of markets as social construct, explaining how combinations of economic, political and legal constraints influence the formation and performance of markets. Historical trajectories and interdependencies among institutional dimensions make it difficult to build costless, non-biased co-ordination mechanisms, and there are limitations to public and private attempts to improve the design of markets. The authors show that incomplete and imperfect modes of governance must be improved upon and combined in order for markets to work more efficiently. This timely book will interest practitioners and academics with backgrounds in economics, law, political science and public policy.

Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T., Jouvet P-A., Willinger M. (2012), Global environmental commons : analytical and political challenges in building governance mechanisms, Oxford, Oxford University Press, XXIII-435 p. p.

Environmental challenges, and the potential solutions to address them, have a direct effect on living standards, the organization of economies, major infrastructures, and modes of urbanization. Since the publication of path-breaking contributions on the governance of environmental resources in the early 1990s, many political initiatives have been taken, numerous governance experiments have been conducted, and a large multi-disciplinary field of research has opened up. This interdisciplinary book takes stock of the knowledge that has accumulated to date, and addresses new challenges in the provision of environmental goods. It focuses on three essential dimensions with respect to governance. First, it addresses the issue of designing governance solutions through analyzing systems of rules, and levels of organization, in the governance and management of environmental issues. Second, it draws renewed attention to the negotiation processes among stakeholders playing a crucial role in reaching agreements over issues and solutions, and in choosing and implementing particular policy instruments. Finally, it shows that compliance depends on a combination of formal rules, enforced by recognized authorities, and informal obligations, such as social and individual norms. The evolution of the research frontiers on environmental governance shows that more legitimate and informed processes of collective decision, and more subtle and effective ways of managing compliance, can contribute to more effective policy. However, this book also illustrates that more democratic and effective governance should rely on more direct and pluralistic forms of involvement of citizens and stakeholders in the collective decision making processes.

Brousseau E., Marzouki M., Méadel C. (2012), Governance, Regulation and Powers on the Internet, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 445 p.

Digital technologies have prompted the emergence of new modes of regulation and governance, since they allow for more decentralized processes of elaboration and implementation of norms. Moreover, the Internet has been raising a wide set of governance issues since it affects many domains, such as individual rights, public liberties, property rights, economic competition, market regulation, conflict management, security and the sovereignty of states. There is therefore a need to understand how technical, political, economic and social norms are articulated, as well as to understand who the main actors of this process of transformation are, how they interact and how these changes may influence international rulings. This book brings together an international team of scholars to explain and analyse how collective regulations evolve in the broader context of the development of post-modern societies, globalization, the reshaping of international relations and the profound transformations of nation-states.

Brousseau E., Siebenhuner B., Dedeurwaerdere T. (2012), Reflexive Governance for Global Public Goods, Cambridge (Mass), MIT Press, 382 p.

Global public goods (GPGs)--the economic term for a broad range of goods and services that benefit everyone, including stable climate, public health, and economic security--pose notable governance challenges. At the national level, public goods are often provided by government, but at the global level there is no established state-like entity to take charge of their provision. The complex nature of many GPGs poses additional problems of coordination, knowledge generation and the formation of citizen preferences. This book considers traditional public economy theory of public goods provision as oversimplified, because it is state centered and fiscally focused. It develops a multidisciplinary look at the challenges of understanding and designing appropriate governance regimes for different types of goods in such areas as the environment, food security, and development assistance. The chapter authors, all leading scholars in the field, explore the misalignment between existing GPG policies and actors' incentives and understandings. They analyze the complex impact of incentives, the involvement of stakeholders in collective decision making, and the specific coordination needed for the generation of knowledge. The book shows that governance of GPGs must be democratic, reflexive--emphasizing collective learning processes--and knowledge based in order to be effective.

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2008), New institutional economics: a guidebook, New York, Cambridge University Press, LVII-558 p. p.

Twenty-one papers explore the accomplishments, limitations, and unmet needs of the field of new institutional economics. Papers discuss the theories of the firm; contracts--from bilateral sets of incentives to the multilevel governance of relations; institutions and the institutional environment; human nature and institutional analysis; the "case" for case studies in new institutional economics; new institutional econometrics--the case of research on contracting and organization; experimental methodology to inform new institutional economics issues; game theory and institutions; new institutional economics, organization, and strategy; interfirm alliances--a new institutional economics approach; governance structure and contractual design in retail chains; make-or-buy decisions--a new institutional economics approach; transaction costs, property rights, and the tools of the new institutional economics--water rights and water markets; contracting and organization in food and agriculture; buying, lobbying, or suing--interest groups' participation in policy making--a selective survey; regulation and deregulation in network industry; constitutional political economy--analyzing formal institutions at the most elementary level; new institutional economics and its application on transition and developing economies; law and economics in retrospect; the theory of the firm and its critics--a stocktaking and assessment; and the causes of institutional inefficiency--a development perspective. Brousseau is Professor of Economics at the University of Paris X and Director of EconomiX. Glachant is Professor of Economics and Head of the Electricity Reforms Group in the ADIS Research Center at the University of Paris-Sud XI. Index.

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2002), The economics of contracts: Theories and applications, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, XVI-584 p. p.

Twenty-five papers survey and illustrate approaches to and applications of contract economics. Earlier versions of most of the papers were published in special issue no. 92 of the Revue d'Economie Industrielle entitled "The Economics of Contracts in Prospect and Retrospect" (2000). Papers discuss the New Institutional Economics; contract and economic organization; the role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships; entrepreneurship, transaction cost economics, and the design of contracts; the contract as economic trade; contract theory and theories of contract regulation; economic reasoning and the framing of contract law; a transaction cost approach to the analysis of property rights; transaction costs and incentive theory; norms and the theory of the firm; allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints; complexity and contract; authority, as flexibility, at the core of labor contracts; positive agency theory; the econometrics of contracts; experiments on moral hazard and incentives; residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts; the quasi-judicial role of large retailers; interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks; licensing in the chemical industry; intercompany agreements and EC competition law; incentive contracts in utility regulation; the performance of different contractual arrangements for water supply in France; lessons from international electricity sector reforms; and a transactions cost perspective on electricity sector restructuring and competition. Brousseau is at the University of Paris X and a member of the Institute Universitaire de France. Glanchant is at the University of Paris XI. Bibliography; name and subject indexes.

Chapitres d'ouvrage

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2014), Path Dependency and Political Constraints in Establishing Property Rights Systems: Introduction to Part II, in Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (eds), The manufacturing of markets: legal, political and economic dynamics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 81-84

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2014), Public and Private Complementarities in Securing Exchange: Introduction to Part I, in Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (eds), The manufacturing of markets: legal, political and economic dynamics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 13-16

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2014), The Political Origin of Competition: Introduction to Part III, in Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (eds), The manufacturing of markets: legal, political and economic dynamics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 145-148

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2014), The Myopia of the Public Hand: Introduction to Part IV, in Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (eds), The manufacturing of markets: legal, political and economic dynamics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 225-228

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2014), The challenge of balancing public and private ordering : introduction to part V, in Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (eds), The manufacturing of markets: legal, political and economic dynamics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 291-294

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2014), The daily adjustment of market technology : introduction to part VI, in Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (eds), The manufacturing of markets: legal, political and economic dynamics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 355-358

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2014), Conclusion : tâtonnement in the manufacturing of markets, in Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (eds), The manufacturing of markets: legal, political and economic dynamics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 441-469

Brousseau E., Marzouki M., Méadel C. (2012), Governance, Networks and Digital Technologies: Societal, Political, and Organizational Innovations, in Brousseau E., Marzouki M., Méadel C. (eds), Governance, Regulation and Powers on the Internet, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 3-36

Digital technologies play a major role in the profound changes that characterize political and economic regulations both within nation states and in international relations. They often provide the conditions for these evolutionary processes by means of new modes of information circulation, of interactions between individuals and of collective organization. They have also prompted the emergence of new modes of regulation and governance. In addition, they raise qualitatively new issues, since global information networks affect the performance of information-based activities, the organization of related industries and coordination between all kinds of stakeholders whose interests are impacted by the rise of the information society. As a result, technical governance and political governance are becoming more and more intertwined. There is therefore a need to understand how technical, political, economic and social norms are articulated, as well as to understand who the main actors in this process of transformation are, how they interact and how these changes may influence international rulings in terms of individual rights, public liberties, property rights, economic competition, market regulation, conflict management, security, state sovereignty, etc. This contributory volume aims to address these related issues from a truly international perspective, with views from different academic cultures and backgrounds. Although the role of digital technologies is highlighted, other factors that are driving our rapidly changing world are also considered.

Brousseau E., Marzouki M. (2012), Internet Governance: Old Issues, New Framings, Uncertain Implications, in Brousseau E., Marzouki M., Méadel C. (eds), Governance, Regulation and Powers on the Internet, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 368-397

In the o pinion of many actors and commentators, Internet Governance tastes like an old wine in a new bottle -- to the extent that some consider, for instance, network neutrality more a matter of co-regulation than of Internet Governance.

Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T., Jouvet P-A., Willinger M. (2012), Introduction: Global Environmental Commons: Analytical and Political Challenges in Building Governance Mechanisms, in Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T., Jouvet P-A., Willinger M. (eds), Global Environmental Commons : Analytical and Political Challenges in Building Governance Mechanisms, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 1-27

The interdependency of socio-ecological systems and the increased reach of human activity have led to major political and scientific challenges in the governance of environmental resources. This chapter reviews the state of our knowledge on the matter. The chapter begins by discussing the specificity of global environmental challenges. Then it discusses three main issues. First, the chapter addresses the question of the optimal level of governance given that environmental goods have wide variation in scope and can be produced according to various aggregation technologies. Second, the chapter argues that the design of governance instruments and regulation should be based on a relevant conception of human motivation and rationality. Third, the chapter revisits the governance toolbox and considers benefits and costs of alternative modes of governing. The chapter concludes by discussing the potential of polycentric and networked governance as well as the need for more integration at the global level.

Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T., Jouvet P-A., Willinger M. (2012), Conclusion: Governance and Environment: Policy Challenges and Research Questions, in Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T., Jouvet P-A., Willinger M. (eds), Global Environmental Commons : Analytical and Political Challenges in Building Governance Mechanisms, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 349-369

Since the publication of path-breaking contributions on the governance of environmental resources in the early 1990s many political initiatives have been taken, many governance experiments have been run, and a large multidisciplinary field of research has opened up. The aim of this interdisciplinary book is to take stock of the dispersed knowledge that has been accumulated over the years and to address the new challenges in the provision of environmental goods by focusing on three essential dimensions with respect to governance. First, it addresses the issue of designing governance solutions through analyzing systems of rules and levels of organization in the governance and management of environmental issues. Second, it draws a renewed attention to the negotiation processes among stakeholders playing a crucial role in reaching agreements over issues and solutions, and in choosing and implementing particular policy instruments. Third, compliance to environmental rules and agreements has become a major problem, especially in a global context where there is no last-resort enforcer. The book shows that compliance depends on a combination of formal rules, enforced by recognized authorities, and informal obligations, such as social and individual norms. All in all, the evolution of the research frontiers on environmental governance show that more legitimate and informed processes of collective decision, and more subtle and effective ways of managing compliance can contribute to more effective policy. However, this book also shows that more democratic and effective governance should rely on more direct and pluralistic forms of involvement of citizens and stakeholders in the collective decision-making processes.

Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T., Siebenhüner B. (2012), Knowledge Matters: Institutional Frameworks to Govern the Provision of Global Public Goods, in Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T., Siebenhüner B. (eds), Reflexive governance for global public goods, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, p. 243-282

The provision of global public goods (GPGs) has been extensively discussed in recent years. This chapter focuses on institutional frameworks for generating the knowledge that is needed to make decisions about the provision of these goods. Currently, there is a lack of knowledge about both needs and solutions.

Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T., Siebenhüner B. (2012), Introduction : Reflexive governance for global public goods, in Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T., Siebenhüner B. (eds), Reflexive governance for global public goods, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, p. 1-17

Dedeurwaerdere T., Brousseau E., Siebenhüner B. (2012), Conclusion : Reflexive Governance for Global Public Goods, in Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T., Siebenhüner B. (eds), Reflexive governance for global public goods, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, p. 315-320

Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T. (2012), Global Public Goods: The Participatory Governance Challenges , in Brousseau E., Siebenhüner B., Dedeurwaerdere T. (eds), Reflexive Governance for Global Public Goods, Cambridge (Mass), MIT Press, p. 21-36

This book addresses the topic of the governance of global public goods (GPGs).

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2012), Regulating Networks in the 'New Economy': Organizing competition to share information and knowledge, in Brousseau E., Marzouki M., Méadel C. (eds), Governance, Regulation and Powers on the Internet, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 63-92

The regulation of network industries has been profoundly transformed in the past twenty years. First, the "object of regulation" is no longer the same. Network industries have been opened to new dynamics, which have overwhelmed their industrial, technological and marketing frameworks. The relationships between players, of whom there are now significant numbers, and the interaction between users and suppliers have been totally reshaped. Beyond economic structures, these industries have been involved in significant societal changes. In short, networks are the infrastructure of our postmodern societies, the necessary conditions for the provision of a large set of "facilities" that form the foundation of both the economy and sociability. Second, "practicable" regulations are no longer the same (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994; Joskow, 2002). In a knowledge-based economy, characterized in particular by extensive innovation, regulatory models designed in the nineteenth century to manage investments and the pricing of transportation infrastructures are no longer relevant. They are unable to handle the new central issues: the interactive dynamics of innovation in the areas of technology, uses and markets (Noam, 2001; Langlois, 2002). Third, Western societies have been evolving dramatically. Governance, specifically, has become more interactive, as suggested by the development of both lobbying and "public opinion" tyranny, which, to a large extent, are both symptoms and causes of the crisis facing traditional representative democracy. In this chapter, we suggest that the regulation of network industries is no longer a question of "command and control," in which the main issue for the regulator is to design "optimal" regulations, given information constraints both ex ante (when rules have to be designed) and ex post (at the implementation stage). Instead, it has become an issue of knowledge-sharing and the alignment of stakeholders' perspectives to guarantee a "satisfying" level of interoperability within a system decentrally managed, open to continuous innovation and characterized by strong systemic consistency constraints. In such a context, the regulator's role is to promote the sharing of knowledge among market participants, both to favor the spontaneous matching of plans and to limit monopoly capture, the latter tending to be more problematic on account of asymmetries of cognition between suppliers and users, leading competitors and followers, and suppliers and regulating entities.

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2010), 'Reflexive' Market Regulation: Cognitive Cooperation in Competitive Information Fora, in De Schutter O., Lenoble J. (eds), Reflexive governance: redefining the public interest in a pluralistic world, Oxford ; Portland, Or., Hart, p. 23-41

Brousseau E., Saussier S. (2009), Contracting with Governments, in Nickerson J., Silverman B. (eds), Economic institutions of strategy, Bingley, U.K, Emerald, p. 487-522

In this paper we review contracting issues raised by a government's decision to contract out activities linked to public services, as well as highlighting potential future research avenues. We first review the different kinds of contracting arrangements and public private partnerships used by government to contract out their activities. In Section 1, we highlight the difficulties linked to the specificities of the arrangements between the government, considered a competent and benevolent dictator, due to complex information and commitment issues. We focus on the different sources of contractual failures resulting from contractual incompleteness and from imperfect competition among the potential private providers of public services. We then focus on the specificities of the relationship between the private and public parties that might be non-benevolent and therefore submitted to specific constraints to control potential disfunctioning like corruption, (see Section 2). Lastly we consider the "government" no longer as an homogeneous entity, but as a complex, multi-purpose organization submitting third parties to specific hazards (Section 3). Suggestions for further research follow in the conclusion.

Brousseau E., Pénard T. (2009), Assembling Platforms: Strategy and Competition, in Madden G., Cooper R. (eds), The economics of digital markets, Cheltenham, E. Elgar, p. 13-26

Brousseau E. (2008), Contracts: From Bilateral Sets of Incentives to the Multi-level Governance of Relations, in Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (eds), New institutional economics : a guidebook, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 37-66

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2008), A Road Map for the Guidebook, in Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (eds), New institutional economics : a guidebook, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. XXXIX-LVII

Brousseau E. (2007), Multilevel governance of the digital space: does a second rank institutional framework exist?, in Brousseau E., Curien N. (eds), Internet and digital economics: principles, methods and applications, Cambridge? ; New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 617-648

Digital Technologies make it possible to decentrally settle institutional frameworks based on self-implementation of exclusive rights of use over information and on the self-regulation of on-line communities. Through a decentralized system of IPRs and collective rules setting of this kind agents would benefit from coordination frames well adapted to their specific needs and preferences. However, such a process can also result in inefficiencies. While becoming subject to exclusion, information and coordination spaces remain non-divisible goods. Moreover, individual and group interests could succeed in taking non-contestable control over "privatized" information spaces. To overcome these weaknesses and threats, an institution of last resort - placed above the agents and the self-regulated communities - should be created and make enforceable constitutional principles with the purpose of guaranteeing some fundamental rights of contents to producers and users. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, it should supervise the behavior of individuals and communities to prevent capture of public wealth by individual interests, to solve conflicts among claims and local regulations, to guarantee enforcement when exclusive rights of use are legitimate. The way to implement it is uncertain, however, since neither a central authority of last resort nor a global community exists to implement it. A combination of open, centralized negotiations among public and private norm setters with a conflict settlement mechanism aimed at harmonizing the proliferating orders could nevertheless lead to the progressive definition of such constitutional basic rights and principles.

Brousseau E., Curien N. (2007), Internet economics, digital economics, in Brousseau E., Curien N. (eds), Internet and digital economics: principles, methods and applications, Cambridge? ; New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 1-55

Marciano A., Brousseau E. (2007), A Contractual Approach to Multi-level Governance, in OECD . (eds), Linking Regions and Central Governments Contracts for Regional Development, Paris, Oecd publications, p. 21-70

This chapter develops an analytic framework for understanding how the economic theory of contracts applies to multi-level governance and what these theories suggest with respect to the selection of a contractual approach. It begins with an overview of the relevant theories, presents an analytic typology of contracts, and assesses the most effective contract design for different co-ordination contexts. The analytic framework developed in this chapter is applied to each of the case studies in subsequent chapters.

Brousseau E., Chaves B. (2006), France: An Alternative Path to Internet-Based e-Commerce, in Kraemer K., Dedrick J., Melville N., Zhu K. (eds), Global e-Commerce: Impacts of National Environment and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 108-140

Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (2002), The Economics of Contracts and the Renewal of Economics, in Brousseau E., Glachant J-M. (eds), The economics of contracts: Theories and applications, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 3-30

Documents de travail

Brousseau E., Sgard J., Schemeil Y. (2011), Sovereignty without Borders: On Individual Rights, the Delegation to Rule, and Globalization, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS, Global Governance Programme-05, San Domenico di Fiesole, European University Institute, 31

Just as medieval municipal republics surrendered to national sovereigns in the past, incumbent states may be replaced in the future by an alternate, global public order. Citizens and merchants would obtain more equal rights, better market infrastructures, and a more efficient provision of public goods at all levels of government, from the local to the global. This proposition is supported by an agentbased, incentive-compatible model where individual rigits-ecknomic and political--are established within an ongoing bargain with rulers. Enfranchisement then shapes the autonomous dynamics of civil society and markets and, over time, allows for feedback of preferences into the core bargain on rights. Globalization results from a capacity to trade and associate that extends far beyond home jurisdictions, yet on the basis of differentiated franchises. In this representation, the world is anarchic, pluralistic, unequal, and growing. Although it is no longer state-centered, long-term change is driven by the attempts and failures of states to establish a more coherent normative infrastructure and to respond to new social demands. From this account, we derive four scenarios of global reordering, among which maximal integration would see the classical nation-state split into two parts: a decentralized, federal structure of government; and a unified legal order that would warrant equal rights and generalized open access throughout the world.

Autres publications

Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T., (2012), Conclusion, in Reflexive Governance and Global Public Goods, in Eric Brousseau, Tom Dedeurwaerdere and Bernd Siebenhüner (eds.), Reflexive Governance and Global Public Goods, Cambridge : MIT Press, p.315-320

Brousseau E., Dedeurwaerdere T., Siebenhüner B., (2012), Introduction, in Reflexive Governance and Global Public Goods, in Eric Brousseau, Tom Dedeurwaerdere and Bernd Siebenhüner (eds.), Reflexive Governance and Global Public Goods, Cambridge : MIT Press, p. 1-17

Brousseau E., Sgard J., Schemeil Y., (2012), Delegation without Borders: On Individual Rights, Constitutions and the Global Order , Global Constitutionalism, Volume 1,Issue 03, pp. 455-484

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