Julien JOURDAN est professeur de stratégie au sein du groupe Management & Organisation de l’université Paris-Dauphine (PSL Research University). Il a reçu un Ph.D. en Management Stratégique et un doctorat en Sciences de Gestion délivré par HEC Paris. Il a occupé des positions académiques à Imperial College (Londres) et Bocconi University (Milan). Son programme de recherche explore les implications stratégiques de l'acquisition de ressources, de la conformité et de l'évaluation sociale des organisations, par l'analyse empirique de larges bases de données d'archives. Sa recherche est publiée dans les meilleures revues académiques en sciences sociales et des organisations, y compris American Journal of Sociology et Academy of Management Journal, et a été distinguée par plusieurs prix internationaux. Avant de s’engager dans une carrière académique, il était Directeur Financier de Warner Bros. Pictures France (groupe TimeWarner). Il conserve un intérêt fort pour les industries créatives, notamment l’industrie du cinéma.
Piazza A., Jourdan J. (2017), When the Dust Settles: The Consequences of Scandals for Organizational Competition, Academy of Management Journal
Recent works have documented the dark side of scandals, revealing how they spread, contaminate associated organizations, and taint the perception of entire fields. We complement this line of work by exploring how scandals durably affect competition within a field, translating into relative advantages for certain organizations over others. First, scandals may benefit organizations that provide a close substitute to the offerings of the implicated organization. Second, scandals pave the way for moralizing discourses and practices, shake taken-for-granted assumptions about the conduct of organizations, and result in a shift in the criteria used to evaluate organizations within the field. Our arguments suggest that organizations whose offerings are most similar to those of the implicated organization, yet perceived as enforcing stricter standards of conduct, are likely to benefit the most from a scandal. We find support for these arguments in a county-level study of membership in the Catholic Church and sixteen other Christian denominations in the United States in the wake of a series of sex abuse cases perpetrated by Catholic clergy between 1971 and 2000. This study contributes to our understanding of the competitive effects of scandals on organizations, and carries important implications for the management of organizations in scandal-stricken fields.
Jourdan J., Durand R., Thornton P. (2017), The Price of Admission: Organizational Deference as Strategic Behavior, American Journal of Sociology, 123, 1, p. 232-275
Why would market organizations engage in symbolic and material acts conveying appreciation and respect to other organizations that confirm their inferior position in an established hierarchy? Deference, we argue, is the price outsider organizations pay to pass categorical and symbolic boundaries, and gain acceptance in contexts where insiders regard them as impure. Because not all organizations can or are willing to pay the price, deference varies according to positional, dispositional, and interactional characteristics. We examine and find support for the view of organizational deference as strategic behavior using empirical evidence on market finance organizations investing in film production in France over two decades. Our analysis expands research on non-conflictual interactions and symbolic boundaries in market settings.
Jourdan J., Kivleniece I. (2017), Too Much of a Good Thing? The Dual Effect of Public Sponsorship on Organizational Performance, Academy of Management Journal, 60, 1, p. 55-77
Existing research provides contradictory insights on the effect of public sponsorship on the market performance of organizations. We develop the nascent theory on sponsorship by highlighting the dual and contingent nature of the relationship between public sponsorship and market performance. By arguing that sponsorship differentially affects resource accumulation and allocation mechanisms, we suggest two opposing firm-level effects, leading to an inverted U-shaped relationship between the amount of public sponsorship received and the market performance of sponsored organizations. This non-linear relationship, we argue, is moderated by the breadth, depth and focus of the focal organization's resource accumulation and allocation patterns. While horizontal scope (i.e. increased breadth) and externally oriented resource profile (i.e. reduced depth) strengthen the relationship, market orientation (i.e. increased focus) attenuates it. We test and find strong support for our hypotheses using population data on French film production firms from 1998 to 2008. Our work highlights the performance trade-offs associated with public sponsorship, and carries important managerial and policy implications.